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ABSTRACT 
The analysis of 162 disturbances from 1979-1995 reported by the North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC) indicates the importance of information systems 
under the regulated and competitive environment, pointing out the major deficiencies in 
current communication and information systems. Based on the analysis, this thesis 
proposes an innovative power system information architecture aimed at correcting these 
deficiencies. The proposed architecture includes power grid automation and control 
systems at all levels, from substation control system to Independent System Operator 
(ISO) operating center, taking into account the requirements of real-time data, security, 
availability, scalability and appropriate Quality of Service (QoS). It uses multiple 
communication channels employing a wide variety of technologies to transmit real-time 
operating data and control signals. The real-time operating and control system is modeled 
with various redundancy configurations; the reliabilities of different configurations are 
studied and compared for practical values of component failure rates and repair rates. 
Configurations that offer a high level of reliability are identified. Finally, several possible 
topics that could be further explored based on this work are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Deregulation and competitive markets for electricity have changed the organizational 
structures of the electricity supply industry as well as the operation of power systems. 
The economic concerns require a better controlled system that can operate closer to its 
limits without increasing the risks involved, thus increasing the profitability and reducing 
the needs for new investments. Interoperability between different entities requires 
adequate information to be brought to operators in a timely manner. 
The electric power grid is highly automated with real-time control and monitoring 
systems, which are usually composed of EMS/SCADA (Energy Management System/ 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) system in the control center and the Remote 
Terminal Units (RTUs). Under the deregulated environments, more players such as the 
Independent System Operator (ISO), Power Exchange (PX), and Independent Power 
Producer (IPP), are introduced into the system. As a result, available real-time 
information and operational data for all entities and players become the key point for 
economic and reliable power system operation and marketing. 
All these requirements brought about by the electric market restructuring together 
with the unanticipated events which may occur at all times indicate that the 
communication and information systems are becoming critically important for reliable 
and economic operation. However, the traditional isolated communication and 
information systems are not adequate for large amount of inter-company information 
exchanges and interoperation due to horizontal mergers and consolidation of many 
existing utilities. Poor coordination caused by lack of timely and adequate information 
exchange can exacerbate the effect of disturbances. A need exists for a better design of 
the communication and information architecture accommodating large information flows 
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to decrease the severity of outages and avoid catastrophic events following major 
failures. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Utilities are operating with the objective of maintaining high reliability at the lowest 
possible cost. In the vertically integrated system, this was relatively easily achievable 
since utilities were performing both grid and marketing functions. Some real-time 
network tools were not widely utilized. Instead, utilities relied upon low-risk, easy-to-
implement, off-line operational planning tools to determine the safe operating region 
based on generation and load pattern forecasting. 
However, the introduction of competition in the energy supply industry is leading to 
the restructuring of the industry [ 1 ][2]. Available transmission and generation facilities 
are highly utilized with large amount of power exchange and wheeling among entities 
and geographical regions. Power systems are operating closer to limits to achieve the 
economic goals. Regardless of these operational and commercial changes, system 
reliability will still be the most important factor, and must be improved. ISOs have been 
formed to manage the generation and transmission system of several areas as one control 
area. Besides the significant economic benefit of operating several areas as one control 
area, the reliability of the overall system will be enhanced with centralized outage 
coordination, generation control, and unified transmission operation and scheduling. 
The restructuring of the industry also leads to restructuring of the Information 
Technology (IT) systems [3] that support power system operations. More real-time 
security analysis applications are introduced into system operation and control 
(EMS/SCADA), such as optimum power flow, transmission constraint, unit commitment, 
voltage stability analysis, and available transfer capability, etc. These tools are required 
to be accurate, fast and reliable, and need to dynamically determine the system security 
limits to achieve economic and reliable operation by providing operators better operation 
and restoration guidelines. 
In addition to the functions and information associated with monitoring and control 
system, which play a primary role in system operation under normal and emergency 
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conditions, the Energy Trading System (ETS) [3] includes functions of market and load 
forecast, transaction scheduling and evaluation, cost monitoring, etc. EMS (in ISO) and 
ETS interact through applications such as information exchange and service request/ 
permission. Deregulation and competition in the industry have resulted in the 
development of a real time market information network called Open Access Same-Time 
Information System (OASIS). OASIS [4] is based on the Internet and provides a range of 
economic and transaction data. Buyers and sellers of electricity post trades to the 
Independent Contract Administrators (ICA) through this network, and the ICAs also post 
all existing transactions on the grid. 
It is clear that information systems play an increasingly important role in the 
deregulated environment. The operational and commercial needs of the power systems 
require information systems not only perform many traditional operational functions but 
also support many new functions specially to meet the needs and impacts of competition. 
Extensive inter- and intra-utility information exchange, integration, consolidation, and 
open access are extremely useful among entities within the competitive power industry. 
Since the traditional power communication system is mainly for intra-company 
information exchange, existing communication tools must be modified or replaced to 
accommodate extensive information exchange and other needs brought by competition. 
An Internet based information network enables information sharing and various network 
applications, providing an ideal infrastructure for the power system communication 
network. Various Internet/Intranet applications are replacing, upgrading, and extending 
the existing power communication systems. As we have mentioned above, OASIS is a 
good example. 
Although many IT and Internet applications in power systems have been developed in 
recent years, there is no universal standard present. Isolated applications hinder the 
development and integration of the power information infrastructure, and lack of 
standards always results in waste of resources. The power industry requires an overall 
information architecture, integrated data model and standard communication network that 
support the different data requirements, rates and qualities of data flow among various 
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entities, taking into account the requirements of real-time data, security, availability, 
scalability and appropriate Quality of Service (QoS). 
1.3 Disturbance Data Analysis and New Information Architecture 
To understand and analyze the cause and impact of failures, we have carefully 
examined 162 disturbances reported by the North American Electric Reliability Council 
(NERC) from year 1979-1995 [ 5] based on 11 possible contributing factors and damage 
assessment. The analysis of these disturbances clearly indicates that problems in real-
time monitoring and operating control system, communication system, and 
operations during restoration contribute to a very high percentage of large failures. 
Based on this analysis, an alternate architecture for the communication and 
information network is proposed aiming to overcome deficiencies of the current 
information systems. It adopts suitable computing and communication techniques to take 
into account the requirements of real-time data, security, availability, scalability and 
appropriate Quality of Service (QoS). 
The proposed architecture includes substation control systems, power plant control 
systems, regional control center, and Independent System Operator (ISO) operating 
center. Suitable communication media for level-to-level and peer-to-peer information 
links are identified. Fault-tolerance for information links is obtained by using multiple 
communication channels employing different communication technologies. 
MultiProtocol Label Switching (MPLS) [6][7] based Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
[8][9][10][11] Internet services employed in the proposed architecture allow timely and 
adequate information exchange among companies, making it possible to share 
computational load between peer systems under failure or overload conditions. The 
distributed hierarchical nature of the proposed architecture reduces the burden on higher-
level computer systems through data aggregation with more relevant and critical 
information presented in control center and the ISO operating center. 
In order to evaluate and compare the benefit of different fault tolerance mechanisms, 
the real time operating and control system is modeled with various redundancy 
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configurations using HiMAP [12], a hierarchical reliability modeling and analysis 
package. The reliabilities of the following fault-tolerant designs are studied. 
• Substation control system modeling with/without communication and/or 
computation redundancies. 
• Control center real-time monitoring and control system modeling with/without 
communication and/or computation redundancies. 
• Operation and control system modeling with varymg computing and/or 
communication redundancies. 
• Operation and control system modeling with different fault-tolerant designs for 
backup control center. 
The studies have been carried out with and without taking repair into account assuming 
fixed failure and repair rates. The studies also assume that the failures are independent, 
i.e., fault in one component does not induce fault in another component. The reliabilities 
of different configurations are studied and compared for practical values of component 
failure rates and repair rates. 
This thesis proposed a new power system information architecture aiming to correct 
the major deficiencies in current communication and information systems, taking into 
account the requirements of real-time data, security, availability, scalability and 
appropriate Quality of Service (QoS). The real-time operating and control system is 
modeled with various redundancy configurations; the reliabilities of different 
configurations are studied and compared for practical values of component failure rates 
and repair rates. Configurations that offer a high level of reliability are identified. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. After a brief introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 
presents the analysis result of disturbances and identifies bottlenecks in current 
information systems. Chapter 3 presents the proposed information architecture, 
describing computational requirements for various entities, and type and nature of 
communication flows among them. The advantages of the proposed architecture and 
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some novel ideas are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 5 carries out the reliability 
analysis of different fault-tolerance configurations, and the results are compared and 
evaluated. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the work that has been done and proposes some 
possible future research directions. 
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CHAPTER 2 DISTURBANCES ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFICATION OF 
BOTTLENECKS 
2.1 Introduction 
NERC has published its findings on bulk electric system disturbances, demand 
reductions, and unusual occurrences since 1979 [5]. In order to understand and analyze 
the cause and impact of failures, we have carefully examined the reviews of selected 
electric system disturbances in North America reported by NERC from 1979-1995. Our 
analysis provides detailed information for every disturbance from the initial faults that 
initiated the disturbances to the contributing factors that amplified the effect of the 
disturbances following the initial faults; a damage assessment is also given for each 
disturbance. Contributing factors are divided into I 0 analysis categories based on the 
NERC Operational Guides and Planning Policies [13]. Problems in each analysis 
category that contribute to the severity for every disturbance are also identified. 
2.2 Disturbance Analysis Based on Initial Faults 
We divide the initiating events of power system disturbances into 9 categories that 
could represent all possible causes and examine the percentages for each of the categories 
among the considered disturbances. The results are listed in Table 2.1. 
From the table, we can see that severe weather, unanticipated faults, and equipment 
failures are among the most common initial causes of disturbances. Stresses in the 
transmission system under competitive markets that were not foreseen and planned for 
will lead to more vulnerable systems if careful operational strategies based on real-time 
network analysis are not available. 
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Table 2.1 Statistical results for initial faults 
Initial cause Severe Fault Accident Equipment Human Relay Sabotage uo weather failure error malfunction 
1979 3 1 2 2 
1980 2 2 2 2 2 
1981 1 5 2 1 1 
1982 2 1 3 2 1 
1983 2 3 1 1 
1984 2 1 1 3 2 4 
1985 1 2 3 3 3 
1986 1 4 1 1 
1987 1 1 2 
1988 1 4 1 3 1 
1989 4 3 1 1 
1990 6 1 3 1 
1991 8 1 3 
1992 1 4 2 4 1 
1993 4 3 1 1 
1994 2 1 1 2 1 1 
1995 3 1 1 1 
Total 41 41 8 34 13 14 3 3 
Percentage 25.31 % 25.31% 4.94% 20.99% 8.02% 8.64% 1.85% 1.85% 
Fault: Phase-to-ground or Phase-to-Phase faults of bus and line. 
UO: Unusual Occurrence such as earthquake, solar magnetic disturbances, etc. 
VR: Voltage Reduction. 
Accident: Uncontrollable factors such as fire, birds, etc. 
VR 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
3.09% 
With the transmission system operating closer to security limits in the deregulated 
environment, the ability to obtain better-controlled systems with the presence of 
predictable or unpredictable events becomes more critical. This requires accurate, fast, 
and reliable on-line security analysis to accurately determine the security limits and 
provide operators timely and adequate operation and restoration guidelines. 
The proposed information architecture suggests efficient on-line security analysis 
tools to be available at every level from the substation control system to the ISO 
operating control center. Besides the traditional State Estimator (SE) and Contingency 
Analysis functions, these tools should also include some new applications such as 
Voltage Stability Analysis (VSA), Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA), and calculation 
of Available Transfer Capability (ATC) [3] for evaluating real-time security and 
determining transmission system limits. With these security analysis tools, a better-
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controlled transmission system that can work closer to its limits without increasing the 
risks involved can be obtained. 
2.3 Disturbance Analysis Based on Contributing Factors 
Following the initial faults, some system components may fail or malfunction, and 
potential deficiencies could be triggered. These deficiencies and failures definitely 
amplify the effect of the disturbances. In order to analyze these contributing factors, we 
have divided them into 10 analysis categories based on the NERC Operational Guides 
and Planning Policies [13]. The percentage for each of these contributing factors among 
the considered disturbances is presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Statistical results for contributing factors 
Contributing factor 1979- 1986- 1991- Total Percentage 1985 1990 1995 
Power system facilities 59 38 36 133 82.10% 
Real-time monitoring and 31 11 18 60 37.04% operating control system 
Communication and 18 15 19 52 32.10% information system 
Personnel performance 28 10 11 49 30.25% 
Operational planning 26 14 9 49 30.25% 
System reserve & generation 15 5 7 27 16.67% response 
Preventive maintenance 17 4 9 30 18.52% 
Load relief 15 2 4 21 12.96% 
Delayed restoration 31 12 19 62 38.27% 
Protection systems 51 25 26 102 62.96% 
Disturbance considered 70 45 47 162 
The results show that problems in real-time monitoring and operating control 
systems, communications systems, and operations during restoration contribute to the 
highest percentage of considered disturbances other than protection systems. We did not 
rank power system facilities since almost all disturbances were exacerbated by either 
equipment failures or forced and planned equipment outages. This reflects the importance 
10 
of network contingency analysis for real-time operation and future operational planning 
to deal with equipment outages. 
2.4 Regional Disturbance Analysis 
As shown in Table 2.1, severe weather, faults, equipment failures and relay 
malfunction account for 80% of the initiating causes of major disturbances. Natural 
phenomena such as ice storms, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods and forest fires are usually 
localized and of short duration but their effects in the power system could be extensive. 
Faults, equipment failures, and relay malfunctions are also localized phenomena, and 
effective innovative supervision on them should be able to limit the likelihood of 
catastrophic failures. 
NERC is divided into 9 regional councils (Figure 2.1), which are ECAR (East Central 
Area Reliability Coordination Agreement), ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of 
Texas), MACC (Mid-Atlantic Area Council), MAIN (Mid-America Interconnected 
Network), MAPP (Mid-Continent Area Power Pool), NPCC (Northeast Power 
Coordinating Council), SERC (Southeastern Electric Reliability Council), SPP 
(Southwest Power Pool), and WSCC (Western Systems Coordinating Council). 
Considering that it may be possible to highlight the major problems of each region, we 
also analyze the 162 disturbances according to their location, based on initial faults and 
contributing factors. The statistical results for WSCC, SERC, NPCC, MAIN, and SPP 
regions are shown in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. 
Among the considered disturbances, only a very small amount of disturbances occur 
in the MAPP, ECAR, ECORT, and MAAC regions, so the statistical results cannot 
represent the overall regional tendency. However, the numerical results for these regions 
are also shown in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. 
From Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, we can see that for the WSCC and MAIN regions, the 
operating/control system and communication system contribute to a much higher 
percentage of disturbances than the average value. While for the SERC region and the 
NPCC region, the performance of the operating/control system and communication 
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system is much better. The percentage of disturbances in the SERC region initially 
caused by equipment failures is much higher than other regions, partly because the 
generation in this region is very centralized. The failures of generation equipment are 
more likely to initiate disturbances since with highly centralized generation distribution; 
loss of one generator may result in insufficient power supply, and thus inevitable system 
outages. 
NERC Regions 
Figure 2.1 NERC regional map 
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Table 2.3 Regional statistical results for initial faults 
Disturbances Region wscc SERC NPCC MAIN SPP 
considered Number 71 30 19 12 10 
Severe Weather 20 7 2 4 3 (28.17%) (23.33%) (10.53%) (33.33%) (30%) 
Fault 18 6 8 2 4 (25.35%) (20%) (42.11%) (16.67%) (40%) 
Equipment failure 8 11 3 3 1 (11.27%) (36.67%) (15.79%) (25%) (10%) 
Human Error 9 1 I I 1 (12.68%) (3.33%) (5.26%) (8.33%) (10%) 
Initial Faults Relay malfunction 8 2 1 I 1 (11.27%) (6.67%) (5.26%) (8.33%) (10%) 
Accident 5 2 1 0 0 (7.04%) (6.67%) (5.26%) 
Sabotage 1 0 I 0 0 (1.41%) (5.26%) 
uo 2 0 0 0 0 (2.82%) 
VR 1 1 2 I 0 (1.41 %) (3.33%) (10.53%) (8.33%) 
Table 2.4 Regional statistical Results for contributing factors 
Disturbances Region wscc SERC NPCC MAIN SPP 
considered Number 71 30 19 12 10 
Power System Facilities 58 26 17 9 9 (81.69%) (86.67%) (89.47%) (75%) (90%) 
System Monitoring, 34 8 4 6 3 
Operatin~ Control (47.89%) (26.67%) (21.05%) (50%) (30%) 
Communications Facilities 29 6 3 7 2 (40.85%) (20%) (15.79%) (58.33%) (20%) 
Operating Personnel 28 7 5 I 2 
Performance (39.44%) (23.33%) (26.32%) (8.33%) (20%) 
Operational Planning 24 10 6 2 0 Contributing (33.80%) (33.33%) (31.58%) (16.67%) 
factors System Reserve & 13 5 2 2 2 
Generation Response (18.31%) (16.67%) (10.53%) (16.67%) (20%) 
Preventive Maintenance 15 I 3 3 2 (21.13%) (3.33%) (15.79%) (25%) (20%) 
Load Relief 6 6 0 2 I (8.45%) (20%) (16.67%) (10%) 
Restoration 39 3 7 4 2 (54.93%) (10%) (36.84%) (33.33%) (20%) 
Protection System 55 16 13 7 6 (77.46%) (53.33%) (68.42%) (58.33%) (60%) 
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Table 2.5 Regional statistical results for initial faults (Contd.) 
Disturbances Region MAPP ECAR ECO RT MAAC 
considered Number 5 3 5 6 
Severe Weather 1 1 1 2 
Fault 1 0 1 1 
Equipment failure 3 2 2 1 
Human Error 0 0 0 0 
Initial Faults Relay malfunction 0 0 0 1 
Accident 0 0 1 0 
Sabotage 1 
uo 0 0 0 0 
VR 0 0 0 0 
Table 2.6 Regional statistical results for contributing factors (Contd.) 
Disturbances Region MAPP ECAR ECO RT MAAC 
considered Number 5 3 5 6 
Power System Facilities 4 3 5 6 
System Monitoring, 0 1 2 3 Operating Control 
Communications Facilities 1 1 2 4 
Operating Personnel 0 0 2 1 Performance 
Contributing Operational Planning 2 1 3 3 
factors System Reserve & 
Generation Response 0 0 0 1 
Preventive Maintenance 3 1 3 I 
Load Relief 0 0 2 
Restoration 0 1 3 4 
Protection System 2 1 2 2 
14 
2.5 Identification of Bottlenecks 
The following are the key bottlenecks in current communication and information 
systems that led to the operation and restoration problems found in many disturbances. 
• Inadequate exchange of real-time operating information and real-time 
coordination among control centers. 
• Lack of automatic communication systems to receive rapid, automatic 
information. 
• Lack of timely communication and failure to use available communication 
systems. 
• The large number of alarms and information overload on computer facilities. 
• Inadequate transmission system security and communication facilities. 
• Inadequate/improper communication or transmission circuits. 
• Power supply failures to communication facilities and circuits. 
• Lack of standard procedure and terms used to exchange real-time operating data. 
• Lack of advanced communication equipments and emergency communication 
equipments. 
• Lack of real-time security analysis and coordinated operation under adverse 
conditions, including the effects of simultaneous transfers in transmission 
interface. 
Current isolated communication and information systems with these deficiencies 
cannot provide fully coordinated operations among entities. This always appears to be the 
reason for delayed restoration. A well-controlled system with secure and reliable 
operation cannot be achieved without adequate data and information sharing, especially 
in the deregulated environment where the merger and consolidation necessitate large 
amount of information exchange and interoperability. 
Aiming to overcome most of the above deficiencies, we propose a novel information 
architecture for power systems in Chapter 3. Together with the architecture, some other 
innovative improvements are also provided for a more secure and scalable information 
system. 
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2.6Summary 
This chapter analyzed 162 disturbances reported by NERC from year 1979-1995 
based on initial faults and contributing factors. The statistical results for different regions 
are also listed. Major deficiencies in current communication and information systems are 
identified to indicate the direction for designing a new information architecture that can 
provide fully coordinated operations and obtain a better-controlled power system. From 
the disturbance analysis, the importance of real-time security analysis tools being 
available under the deregulated environments is highlighted. These security analysis tools 
will be discussed in Chapter 3 together with the proposed information architecture. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE PROPOSED INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE 
3.1 Schematic of the Proposed Information Architecture 
The proposed information architecture, shown in Figure 3.1, employs a distributed 
hierarchical computational structure to meet the goals of fault-tolerance and scalability 
requirements of power systems. The architecture shows a layers of abstraction of which 
the bottom two layers (substations and control center) are mainly concerned with the 
operational aspects of the power systems, while the top two layers (control center and 
ISO/Energy Trading System) are concerned with both the operational and the planning 
aspects of the power systems. In this layered architecture, the granularity of real-time 
guarantees is coarse at the top layer (i.e., typical computation and communication 
deadlines are in hours) and it becomes fine-grained as we go down to lower layers (e.g., 
at substation, the deadline is in seconds). On the other hand, the amount of data 
processing involved increases as we go from the bottom layer to the top layer. This clear 
separation of the computations based on deadline granularity and data processing means 
that the proposed distributed computing architecture can efficiently integrate diverse 
algorithms and analysis techniques pertaining to operation and planning of power 
systems. 
The proposed information architecture includes all aspects of substation (power plant) 
control system, control center, and ISO operating control center [1][2]. All Local Area 
Networks (LANs) are connected to the MPLS [6][7] based VPN [8][9][10][11] firewall 
while still keeping the traditional links from substation (power plant) to control center, 
from control center to ISO operating center, and from ISO operating center to Energy 
Trading System (ETS). The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) [14] in the company Intranet is a 
specific area allowing external partners and customers to access needed information 
without sacrificing the security of the control center. The distributed hierarchy of Energy 
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Management System (EMS)/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems in this architecture is obvious. Following is the description of the communication 
flows and computational requirements in the proposed information architecture. 
Advantages and new functions provided in the proposed architecture together with 
suggested fault-tolerance mechanisms will be also discussed in this chapter. 
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Figure 3.1 Proposed information architecture 
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3.2 Communication Flows 
Following is the description of the data and information links connecting different 
information processing entities of the system in Figure 3.1. Suitable communication 
technologies [15][16] for each of the links are also listed in priority order. 
1) Communication link 1 
• End points: ISO operating center and energy trading system. 
•!• Type and nature of data flows: Near real-time information such as power 
grid data, security evaluations, scheduling, forecasting, transaction 
approval and curtailment, etc. 
•!• Non real-time information such as long-term operation planning, long-
term scheduling, etc. 
• Suitable wired communication: Fiber Optic Cable, VPN Internet, and Power 
Line Carrier (PLC). 
• Suitable wireless communication: Microwave and Satellite. 
2) Communication link 2 
• End points: control center and corporate LAN. 
• Type and nature of data flows: 
•!• Near real-time information such as system operating data, load and supply 
scheduling, load forecasting, etc. 
•!• Non real-time information such as long-term operation planning, 
maintenance activities, etc. 
• Suitable wired communication: Fiber Optic Cable, VPN Internet, and Metallic 
Cable. 
• Suitable wireless communication: Microwave and Satellite. 
3) Communication link 3 
• End points: ISO operating center and control center. 
• Type and nature of data flows: 
•!• Real-time information such as system operating data, control signals, etc. 
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•!• Near real-time information such as load and supply scheduling, load 
forecasting, transaction approval and curtailment, etc. 
• Suitable wired communication: Fiber Optic Cable, VPN Internet, and Power 
Line Carrier. 
• Suitable wireless communication: Microwave and Satellite. 
4) Communication link 4, 5. and 6 
• End points: control center and substation (power plant) control system. 
• Type and nature of data flows: 
•!• Real-time information such as operating data, control signals, etc. 
•!• Near real-time information such as load and supply scheduling, load 
forecasting, etc. 
• Suitable wired communication: Fiber Optic Cable, VPN Internet, and Power 
Line Carrier. 
• Suitable wireless communication: Microwave and Satellite. 
5) Communication link 7, 8, and 9 
• End points: peer substation control systems (peer power plant control 
systems). 
• Type and nature of data flows: 
•!• Real-time or near real-time information such as necessary system 
operating data, computational results, etc. 
• Suitable wired communication: Fiber Optic Cable, VPN Internet, and Power 
Line Carrier. 
• Suitable wireless communication: Microwave and Satellite. 
3.3 Computational Requirements 
The computation hierarchy in the proposed architecture is distributed in nature; it 
reduces the burden on higher-level computer systems through data aggregation. Pre-
processed data from lower level systems can improve capabilities, accuracy and 
efficiencies of the higher level computing systems. More relevant and critical information 
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are brought to the operators in the control center and ISO operating center, and this is 
especially important during contingencies for the operators to quickly understand the 
actual situation and make correct decisions, while the bursty nature of the data during 
contingency periods in the centralized computation system always causes overload or 
even malfunction of the system. Following are the computational requirement for various 
entities in the proposed information architecture. 
1) Substation (power plant) control system 
• Acquisition of real-time status and analog data from Remote Terminal Units 
(RTUs) and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). 
• Alarm processing triggered by the changed or faulty operation status. 
• State estimation based on the redundant metered data to determine the actual 
operating points. 
• Voltage stability analysis to determine where voltage instability and collapse 
will happen. 
• On-line and off-line contingency analyses. 
• Dispatch of supplies (power plants) and loads (substations). 
• Diagnosis tools for maintenance activities, etc 
2) Control center EMS/SCADA system 
• Real-time data acquisition and analysis for supervisory control. 
• Alarm processing, state estimation, voltage stability analysis and contingency 
analysis for regional benefits. 
• Dynamic security analysis to determine the stable operating margin. 
• The ATC calculation to determine the largest transferable power flow without 
causing system security problems. 
• Scheduling and dispatch of supplies, load, and ancillary services. 
• Load and ancillary services forecasting using the available historical load and 
weather data. 
• Control of load, frequency, and voltage. 
• Diagnosis tools for maintenance activities, etc. 
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3) ISO EMSISCADA system 
• All the applications in the control center are also required in the ISO operating 
center except that these applications in the ISO operating center are for the 
benefit of the whole area. 
• Transactions approval and curtailment based on the actual power system 
transmission network conditions. 
• Transmission pricing, etc. 
3.4 Illustration of New Applications 
In the new deregulated environment, traditional applications that support system 
security plays a more critical role. Market forces will lead to stresses on the transmission 
system that were not previously foreseen or planned for, transmission systems are 
operating closer to their security limits. The ability to accurately determine these security 
limits to achieve economic and also reliable power grid operations becomes very 
important. In Section 3.3, we have suggested security analysis tools available at every 
level of the operating and control system, from substation control system until ISO 
operating control center, to accurately and quickly determine the system limits. 
The State Estimator (SE) function [17], which can determine the real-time state of the 
system as a starting point of the security analysis, is critically important. This is 
especially true for the case of real-time pricing calculations. Contingency analysis [ 18] 
application should be accurate, fast, and reliable, for a predictable system behavior. The 
most important factors for contingency analysis tools are algorithm selection and 
contingency screening. 
Besides traditional state estimator and contingency analysis functions, there are also 
some new applications such as Voltage Stability Analysis (VSA), Dynamic Security 
Assessment (DSA), and calculation of Available transfer Capability (ATC) [3] for 
evaluating real-time security and determining transmission system limits. The following 
will focus on several of these new applications. Together with them, the congestion 
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management function introduced by simultaneous transactions over the transmission 
network will also be discussed in this section. 
3.4.1 Voltage Stability Analysis (VSA) 
On-line VSA [19] operates as a component of the EMS to monitor the voltage 
behavior of the power system periodically, on demand, and upon occurrence of 
significant changes in the state of the power system. As regard to voltage stability 
analysis, the first thing is to find out a special measurement, computable on-line, which 
could indicate the distance to potential collapse. Many quantities have been proposed 
such as voltage drops and loss evolution. However, the margin with respect to voltage 
collapse is now considered to be the best indicator. There are several approaches to 
compute the margin; many of them use continuation power flow technique [20], while 
others were based on direct computation through optimization [21]. 
VSA applications provide a tool for the assessment and prevention of voltage collapse 
problems. There are usually two modes of utilization. In the real-time mode, VSA 
analyzes the voltage stability starting from the current system conditions. While in the 
study mode, VSA is used to study future transactions and transmission access requests 
based on system planning; it may be initialized from the state estimator solution, or a 
power flow solution. 
For a voltage stability limited power systems, it is necessary to compute the power 
transfer limits on key tie lines such that the system survives the voltage impacts caused 
by contingencies. VSA computes the transfer flow limits for the most severe 
contingencies and presents them to the operator as an operating guideline. 
3.4.2 Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) 
System stability results have been part of electric utilities' operating guidelines for 
more than a decade. Nowadays, these guidelines are complied from off-line stability 
studies conducted jointly with other utilities and independently by each utility. However, 
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the off-line stability study results are adjusted for actual generation patterns and network 
conditions, based on sensitivity analysis, and presented to system operators through the 
energy management system. These stability limits from off-line security tools tends to be 
conservative for normal conditions and even inaccurate following unusual system events 
and significant network model changes. 
Limits of off-line studies also require extensive engineering analysis, trying to 
anticipate conditions that may never occur. These off-line studies are no longer suitable as 
utilities are operating closer to the limits under the competitive environment. A better 
alternative is to compute these limits on-line based on the actual operating conditions. 
Dynamic Security Analysis (DSA) [22] function implemented in the EMS environment 
would improve reliability, identify additional energy transaction potential, and result in 
better use of engineering resources. 
The purpose of the on-line DSA function is to: 
• Monitor the state of the power system periodically, on demand, and upon 
occurrence of significant changes in the state of power system. 
• Ensure power system security against the occurrence of pre-defined specific or 
generic dynamic contingencies. 
In addition, it provides a study mode option where the initial conditions provided by 
the state estimator may be modified to provide for day-ahead planning situations. 
In the real-time mode, every few minutes, the DSA function provides the system 
operator information on the security status of the system, determines the relevant 
operating limits (interface flow limits, generation limits), identifies the limiting 
contingencies, and compute indices quantifying the degree of stability or instability for 
each case. It also provides trends of system indices based on prior DSA executions to 
indicate whether system dynamic security is improving or degrading. 
The basic requirements of DSA function include: contingency definition, contingency 
list, modeling and data requirements, and security criteria. The main features of the on-
line DSA function are as following: 
• Contingency screening to reduce a large number of cases down to a list of 
potentially severe cases. 
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• Time simulation to perform accurate transient stability assessment of the 
contingencies processed by the screening function and to rank the contingencies 
according to their severity. 
• Calculations of power transfer limits for critical contingencies. 
• Concurrent processing of contingencies using symmetrical multi-processing 
workstations. 
3.4.3 Available Transfer Capability (ATC) 
Available Transfer Capability (ATC) [23] is the measure of the transfer capability 
remaining in the physical transmission network for further commercial activity over and 
above the already committed uses. It is defined as TTC (Total Transfer Capability) less 
Existing Transmission Commitments (ETC), less the Transmission Reliability Margin 
(TRM), less the Capacity Benefit Margin (CBM). Thus, the formula for calculating ATC 
is give by: ATC = TTC - ETC - TRM - CBM. 
The TTC is the amount of electric power that can be transferred reliably from one 
area to another area of the interconnected transmission systems by way of all 
transmission lines (or paths) between those areas under specified system conditions; ETC 
is the existing transmission commitment, including retail customers, between the same 
two areas. TRM [24] [25] is the amount of transfer capability necessary to ensure that 
transmission systems are secure under a range of uncertainties in system conditions. 
CBM [26] is the amount of transfer capability reserved by load-serving entities to ensure 
access to generation from interconnected systems to meet generation reliability 
requirements. 
In its bid to open up access to electric power transmission networks, to foster 
generation competition and customer choice, The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) required that ATC information be available on public accessible 
Open Access Same-time Information System (OASIS) [4]. This information is useful for 
reserving transmission services, scheduling firm and non-firm energy transactions, and 
for arranging emergency transfers between areas of an interconnected power system. 
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3.4.4 Congestion Management 
The goal of deregulation is to encourage lower electric utility rates by structuring an 
orderly transition to competitive bulk power markets. The key is to open up transmission 
services; all wholesale buyers and sellers must have equal access to the transmission grid. 
All transactions will have to share the same transmission network simultaneously, and it 
is essential to determine how congestion management will be performed when 
transmission congestion occurs. So the issues of how much congestion management costs 
and who pays for these congestion costs have to be determined [3]. 
One approach for congestion management is to provide a global uplift charge, which 
is paid by all market participants. The second approach is to determine the price 
associated with supplying power to the individual buses in the system. Market 
participants then pay for congestion as it is reflected in the price associated with their 
locations of consumption. A third approach, which is a combination of the first two, is 
also being used. Congestion between zones is paid for based on zonal prices. Congestion 
within a zone is paid for by market participants within the zone using an uplift charge. 
United kingdom adopts the first approach; PJM is an example of the second approach, 
while California in the United States is practicing the third approach. 
Those new applications reflect the changes in information technology system that 
supports power system operation with the significant reconstructing of the electricity 
supply industry; they help determine where the system operating edge is and how close 
the system is to the edge. 
3.5 Advantages of the Proposed Information Architecture 
In the following, a detailed discussion about the advantages provided by the new 
features of the proposed information architecture is given. 
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3.5.1 MPLS Based VPN 
The deregulated environment of the current power industry requires large information 
and data exchange and interoperability among companies to obtain a better-controlled 
power system that can operate in a more reliable and economic manner. As a result, the 
traditional isolated communication and information systems with low bandwidth are 
becoming obsolete, and tremendous benefits have already been foreseen from an Internet-
based communication network [27]. 
However, the concerns about the performance and QoS issues of the Internet hindered 
its further applications in power systems. The current Internet is based on best effort 
services without any QoS guarantees, while power systems need an automatic 
communication system to receive timely and adequate information and data for real-time 
coordination especially under adverse conditions. Real-time features of power system 
communication cannot afford delays due to network traffic or re-transmission caused by 
errors, etc. The failure of transferring a control signal from the control center to the 
substation may cause cascading outages during contingency situations. 
Another obstacle to employing Internet in power systems is the security problem. 
Packets transmitted over the Internet may be eavesdropped by hackers with malicious 
purposes. Intruders illegally accessing internal networks through Internet could 
manipulate the system to malfunction or even cause outages. Moreover, the security issue 
now also has monetary implications for power companies because of the competition 
among them. 
In the proposed architecture, MPLS based VPN aims to address the above stated 
issues. 
I) VPN (Virtual Private Network) 
Although the advent of high-speed access media are now available and affordable to 
power system entities to overcome the access speed limitation between LANs of entities, 
a company's Intranet is not easily accessed due to firewall and security restrictions. So a 
reliable and fast mechanism to authenticate valid users and restrict their accesses based 
on their access privileges is urgently needed. However, in the traditional private network 
27 
of an entity, this kind of special access is very difficult to incorporate because it is not 
easy to install dedicated links to all the partners, suppliers, and customers. 
A virtual private network can help resolve many of the issues of the current isolated 
private networks of power grid monitoring and control systems, realizing automated and 
real-time communication between entities. VPN [8][9][10][1 l] is a communication 
environment constructed by controlled segmentation of a shared communication 
infrastructure to emulate the characteristics of a private Wide Area Network (WAN) over 
the shared network infrastructure, which is usually the public Internet. In the proposed 
information architecture, the shared network infrastructure is public Internet. 
The traffic originating and terminating within a virtual private network traverses only 
those nodes that belongs to the private network, i.e., traffic corresponding to this VPN 
will not affect or be affected by other traffic outside the VPN. The VPN facilitates an 
agile IT infrastructure. Global VPNs enable connectivity to all locations anywhere in the 
world with the cost much lower than that of dedicated links. VPN services can also 
enable remote access for a mobile workforce under much lower cost. 
Three primary services of VPN are identified for an entity local area network to 
connect with friendly entities over the Internet. The services differ in the entities 
connected: remote users (Dial-up services), Branch office networks (LAN Interconnect 
services), and partners/customers (Extranet services). 
• Dial-up services: This service supports mobile and telecommuting employees in 
accessing the company's Intranet from remote locations. An ideal VPN enables 
the remote users to work as if he/she was at a workstation in the office. 
Authentication, transparency and ease of use for the remote users are crucial for 
this service. 
• LAN Interconnect services: This service helps to interconnect local area network 
located at multiple geographic areas over the public Internet. Typically, it is used 
to connect multiple geographical locations of a single company. The Intranets are 
protected by firewalls that are the ideal locations to deploy VPN software. All 
Internet traffic exchange between the two Intranets is secured. Its broad and 
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transparency security and the relative simplicity make this a popular VPN 
service. 
• Extranet services: This service represents the most recent trend for VPN usage 
and also the lease mature field. It enables external partners, suppliers and 
customers to access specific areas of the company's Intranet. The allowed 
specific area is denoted as the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which will be 
illustrated in Section 3.4.2. The firewall and authentication mechanisms ensure 
that connections from external users are directed to the DMZ. The flexibility of 
the extranet services helps to provide connectivity to new external partners, 
suppliers, and customers within a short period of time. Moreover, the fast 
communications facilitated by the extranet helps in data exchange. 
It should be mentioned that only network layer VPNs are general enough to handle all 
three services. The network layer VPNs are usually based on Internet Protocol (IP) at the 
network layer. These VPNs can be implemented either by tunneling or by network layer 
encryption. In the tunnel mode, the end-points of the tunnel are common nodes of the 
VPN and the shared network infrastructure; network layer encryption provides a secure 
mechanism for implementing VPNs [10][11]. 
VPN technology is still in its infancy. But the general belief is that in a couple of 
years, VPN will evolve and demonstrate all the advantages that have been promised. 
VPN will be a global technology linking geographical regions around the world. 
2) MPLS (MultiProtocol Label Switching) 
MPLS [6][7] uses a simple label-swapping algorithm replacing the standard 
destination-based hop-by-hop forwarding paradigm to quickly forward packets. MPLS 
attaches labels to IP packets; the labels enable routers and switches to forward traffic 
based on information in the labels instead of having to inspect the various fields deep 
within each and every packet. Another MPLS benefit is the ability to simplify the 
topologies of large router networks. MPLS helps to flatten hierarchical and hop intensive 
routed infrastructures. It makes them easier to monitor, manage, and operate. MPLS can 
also help control QoS and general traffic flow more precisely to avoid congested, 
constrained or disabled links. 
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MPLS promises to deliver improved IP network traffic engineering tools that will 
enable providers to more easily measure, monitor, and meet different service level 
requirements across their backbones, it takes advantage of the intelligence in routers and 
the speed of switches, providing a way to map IP packets into connection-oriented 
transports like ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) and Frame Relay in a reasonably 
efficient and scalable way. MPLS allows ISPs (Internet Service Providers) to offer VPN 
services by providing a simple, flexible, and powerful tunneling mechanism. Supporting 
VPNs with MPLS requires three basic functions as following. 
• Discovery of membership: The members in MPLS VPN domain should be 
connected to a provider network and those members need to find out what other 
members are there in the VPN. The discovery in one VPN must be kept separate 
from discovery in another VPN in the same provider network. 
• Exchanging reachability information: Members in the same VPN must exchange 
reachability information about their network layer addresses. The exchange of 
reachability and control traffic must also be kept separate between VPN s sharing 
that same provider network. 
• Carrying data traffics: This mechanism enables data traffic to be carried between 
users within a VPN. Data traffic from different VPNs is kept separate. Data 
traffic is carried on LSPs (Label Switching Paths) which are created to connect all 
members of the same VPN. 
MPLS can provide many of the same advantages of a connection oriented network 
while still retaining the underlying efficiency and operation of a datagram network, 
controlling general traffic flow more precisely and obtaining guaranteed performance and 
service level. Although still in draft form, MPLS has become a technology that is key to 
the future of large-scale IP networks. 
Employing the services of the MPLS VPN scheme in the proposed architecture 
indicates its capability to provide a secure and real-time communication network for 
power systems. The benefit of assured performance and QoS mechanisms are obvious. 
The proposed architecture also can provide employees reliable access to company 
intranet from remote sites, it is meaningful not only in mobility of workplace but also in 
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the possibility to bring as much human forces into the system as possible during 
emergency periods. 
3.5.2 Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 
Sometimes Demilitarized Zone [ 14] is also called sacrificed zone. It is a special area 
that allows external independent players and customers to access needed information 
without invading the corporate system. The DMZ in the company Intranet of the 
proposed architecture is another measure for security. Usually it is composed of World 
Wide Web (WWW) server, mail server and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server (Figure 
3.2), more servers may be added depending upon what services the company would like 
to provide for external partners and customers. 
Engineering Data Maintenance Data 
Corporate LAN 
.------- ------------ --------------- ---------~ 
I 
VPN : Mail FTP WWW I 
: Server Server Server 
I----~----~ -----~ 
:----------------------~-----------------! 
DMZ 
Figure 3.2 Demilitarized zone 
The WWW server is connected to the EMS/SCADA database server to get the real-
time and historical data, documents and information that can be shared with the web 
browser [28]. Files stored in the FTP server can be accessed and transferred by valid 
users. The mail server deals with the incoming and outgoing emails for employees and 
the company. All connection requests from legal locations and users outside the VPN will 
be directed to the DMZ by the firewall and authentication mechanisms. Of course, 
connections required by employees from remote sites will be approved with full access to 
the company's Intranet. This architecture of VPN services with the specific area DMZ 
has flexibility. It can connect new partners and customers within a very short period of 
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time, providing significant cost reduction and the ability to effectively compete in the 
rapidly growing market. 
3.5.3 Fault Tolerance for Different System Components 
For power control and automation systems, fault tolerance is the ability to maintain 
expected service level even in the presence of communication and/or sub-system faults. 
Following are several possible faults and the fault-tolerance mechanisms incorporated in 
the proposed architecture. 
1) RTU Faults 
If RTUs (IEDs) fail, the real-time status and analog data from field devices cannot be 
transmitted to computer systems, also control signals cannot be sent to field devices. If 
high reliability of the RTU (IED) is desired, then hardware redundancy should be adopted 
[29]. For example, if a RTU (IED) is operating in 1+1 redundancy, and each has identical 
reliability R = 0.99, then the overall reliability of the RTU is: 
Rov = 1 - (1 - R) 2 = 0.9999 
We can see from the numbers that the reliability can be significantly improved by 
increasing the redundancy. However, redundancy implies higher cost, so there is trade-off 
between reliability and cost. 
2) Communication link faults 
Multiple communication channels for each information link in the proposed 
architecture are suggested to tolerate communication link faults. Based on performance 
requirements and economic concerns, appropriate communication technologies for each 
channel are listed in Table 3.1. 
Important communication links 3, 4, 5 and 6 (shown in Figure 3.1), which connect 
different level systems for transmission of real-time data and control signals, should be 
provided with wireless backup channels in case some catastrophic events, such as an 
earthquake, destroy all wired communication channels. Fiber optic cable is usually 
adopted as a primary communication channel because of its high reliability and small 
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latency. Note that, VPN could include a combination of wired and wireless 
communication links. 
Table 3.1 Comm. media for primary and backup channels 
Link Number 
Primary Channels (Wired) Backup Channels (Wireless) 
1 2 1 2 
Fiber Optic 
MPLS based VPN 
Satellite (If 
1 
(Metallic) Cable applicable) 
2 Metallic Cable MPLS based VPN 
Satellite (If 
3 Fiber Optic Cable MPLS based VPN Microwave 
applicable) 
Fiber Optic Cable Satellite (If 
4, 5 and 6 MPLS based VPN Microwave 
(PLC) applicable) 
7, 8 and 9 MPLS based VPN MPLS based VPN 
Communication link 1 can use either fiber optic or metallic cable as the primary 
channel 1 depending on whether the ISO operating center is in the same building as the 
ETS or not. 
Communication link 2 uses metallic cable as its primary channel since the two LANs 
that it connects are usually in one building. However, if in the very special case where the 
control center is far away from the corporate LAN, then fiber optic cable should be used 
as the primary communication channel 1. 
Communication links 7, 8 and 9 utilize MPLS VPN Internet services to obtain real-
time or near real-time communication, realizing load sharing between peer systems under 
failure or overload conditions. The carefully designed multi-path routing over the public 
Internet between peer systems can provide fault-tolerance for communication link faults. 
3) Substation control system faults 
Substation computers and substation local area networks with access to the Utility 
WAN are becoming a necessary part of power system computer networking. It provides 
utilities software tools to convert large amount of data from the RTUs (IEDs) into useful 
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information, realizing the idea of distributed EMS/SCADA systems to reduce the 
computational burden of the control center and help a utility to achieve reduced 
inst~lation, maintenance, and operation costs. 
But the substation control system has the possibility to fail or become overloaded. 
Real-time operation cannot be guaranteed in this scenario, and during a contingency the 
situation could deteriorate. 
It is also not practical to build backup systems for every substation control system. 
However, the proposed architecture provides load-sharing mechanism between substation 
control systems under failure or overload conditions. Every substation control system is 
backed up without new investments. 
Figure 3.2 shows the two levels of fault-tolerance achieved in the proposed 
architecture: (1) LAN level fault-tolerance by employing dual bus Ethernet configuration, 
(2) Substation control system fault-tolerance by employing backup control system for 
each primary system. In order to facilitate efficient checkpointing of the state of the 
primary control system, a VPN based connection is provided between these two systems. 
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Figure 3.3 Interconnected substation LANs 
In the proposed architecture, every network element involved in the distribution 
automation communication is assigned an Internet Protocol (IP) address corresponding to 
its relative position in the power distribution network [30], so that an individual JED that 
is in charge of certain number of communication devices acts as a subnet. This universal 
Internet address assignment mechanism can provide quick connection from IEDs in the 
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failed substation LAN to the selected backup substation; it also allows several substation 
control systems to share the load of the failed system. 
In Figure 3.2, substation control system 2 also acts as the backup for the backed up 
control system 1 in hot standby mode, getting the same updates in its database. The paths 
between the two systems are carefully designed over the public Internet with certain level 
of redundancy. In the case only one or two applications malfunction in system 1, system 
2 will take care of these applications and send the computation results back to system 1. 
However, when the master in system 2 senses no communication from system 1, it will 
try to send a querying message. After making sure that the substation control system 1 
has failed, the backup substation control system 2 will make a quick connection with 
IEDs (RTUs) in the failed substation 1 using their subnet addresses, executing real-time 
data acquisition and critical computation functions for both itself and the backed up 
system 1. 
In the worst scenario, the backup system may not be able to process the heavier 
communication and computational load of two entire systems. In order to gain graceful 
degradation, the critical hierarchy of information and applications is identified to find the 
most critical tasks that must be executed in a timely manner for reliable and secure power 
system operation. Non-critical and long-term applications for communication and 
computation with lower priority will be ignored during emergency conditions to 
guarantee the successful execution of the most critical ones. At the same time, the backup 
system can search for other systems to share loads with them using two dynamic 
methods: flooding method or priority-based method. 
The flooding method sends requests to every substation control system that can help, 
while priority-based method will request one by one according to a priority list until a 
system with the capability to help is found. Compared to the priority-based method, the 
flooding method can quickly find the best backup system, but it could cause network 
congestion problems. The two methods can be used in different scenarios for different 
purposes. For example, system 2 is overloaded after system 1 failed. If a system 3 can be 
found for sharing the load, then all necessary data for the applications which system 3 can 
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perform for system 2 will be sent to system 3. Certain amount of non-critical functions of 
system 2 (backup) and system 1 (failed system) can be served in this manner. 
4) Control center EMS/SCADA system faults 
Every control center should have a backup center with different backup levels [31]. 
While the same idea of load-sharing mechanism can be applied to the control center when 
the backup control center does not duplicate all capabilities and functions of the primary 
center. However, the situation for load sharing between control centers is complicated. 
Since large changes in computational load are possible even without a failed system, load 
sharing among systems will be needed more frequently. A well-designed scheme to find 
the most suitable system for load sharing is needed for control center EMS/SCADA 
systems. 
3.6Summary 
This chapter proposed a novel information architecture for power systems. The 
computing requirements for various entities in the proposed architecture and the 
communication flows among them are described. The proposed information architecture 
employs the MPLS based VPN services for secure and real-time communication network 
of power systems, which are essential for timely and adequate information exchange 
among entities. DMZ in the corporate intranet is another measure for security; it allows 
external partners and customers securely access needed information. The proposed 
information architecture takes into account fault-tolerance of several system components 
such as RTUs (IEDs), communication links, and automation and control systems. The 
load-sharing scheme between peer computer systems based on MPLS VPN Internet 
services is suitable for possible large changes in computational loads brought about by 
external partners or failed EMS/SCADA systems. The distributed nature of the 
computation in the proposed architecture reduces the burden on the higher-level 
computer systems through data aggregation, providing better operation and restoration 
guidelines for operators with more relevant and critical information. It is important that 
necessary security analysis tools be available at every level, from substation control 
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system until ISO operating control center, to obtain reliable and better-controlled power 
system operation. In all, the proposed information architecture can overcome most of the 
deficiencies of the current communication and information systems, providing secure, 
reliable, timely and scalable communication systems with guaranteed QoS; it will 
definitely promote the process of data integration and standardization from all power 
system entities. 
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CHAPTER 4 FAULT TOLREANCE DESIGN AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
The automation and control system plays a primary role in the operation of power 
systems under normal and emergency conditions. Under the deregulated and competitive 
environment, some real time power system applications which can accurately determine 
system security limits are important in obtaining reliable, economic,. and better controlled 
power system operations. These applications also greatly rely on computing and 
communication techniques. So the consequences of failure and down time of operation 
and control systems including the communication systems are more severe. In critical 
applications such as transportation of remote control signals, failure may lead to 
unavailability of the actual power system or even cascading events. A fault-tolerant 
control and automation system is therefore highly desired. Fault tolerance is a system's 
ability to deliver the expected service even in the presence of faults. For a real-time 
system, fault tolerance is the ability to deliver the expected services in a timely manner 
even in the presence of faults [29]. Hence, fault-tolerance is an inherent requirement of 
EMS/SCADA systems and substation control systems, which are for real-time 
monitoring and controlling of the power systems. Usually, redundancy approaches are 
used to achieve fault tolerance. 
4.2 Concepts of reliability 
Dependability is a qualitative system attribute that is quantified through specific 
measures that express the system's ability to tolerate failures, and the two primary 
measures of dependability are reliability and availability. Reliability is the probability of 
a system's surviving (potentially despite failures) over an interval of time. While 
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availability is the probability of a system's being operational at any given instant. A 
system with high availability may in fact fail. 
All reliability models begin with certain assumptions about the rate at which the 
various elements that make up the system fail. If P(t) is the probability that an element is 
still functioning properly at time t, i.e., the element's reliability, then the failure rate A(t) 
defined by the equation 
' 
A.(t) = lim P(t) + P(t +lit) = _ P (t) 
Lit~O P(t)lit P(t) 
and we can get: 
P(t) = e -J~A.(r) 
Under normal conditions, the failure rate A.(t) is usually characterized as a "bath tub 
function" oft as indicated in Figure 4.1. It looks like a bathtub. During the initial period 
the failure rate decreases rapidly with time because in any large collection of components 
there are usually components with defects and these fail. The middle phase is called the " 
useful life" period when the failure rate is relatively constant. The final period is the 
"wear out" period where the failure rate increases rapidly with time. For well screened 
elements during manufacturing process which have few wear-out mechanisms, the 
constant value A.(t) = A seems to be an accurate model for a very large range oft, then 
P(t) = e-A.t 
where the reliability of the element is defined by an exponential distribution. In our 
system reliability models every system model adopts fixed failure rate. 
The average time a system will run between failures, which is known as the mean-
time-between-failure (MTBF), is usually expressed in hours and is given by [ R(t)dt, 
i.e. it is the area underneath the reliability curve R(t) plotted versus t; this result is true for 
any failure distribution. For the exponential failure law, 
MTBF = [ exp(-At)dt 
I 1+ r I = - ;i I exp(-M) 10 = ;i 
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In other words, the MTBF of a system is the reciprocal of the failure rate. If A. is the 
number of failures per hour, the MTBF is expressed in hours. 
Failure rate 
(A.) 
Time (t) 
Figure 4.1 Variation of failure rate with time 
When a system or an individual component fails, repair action is normally carried out 
to restore the system to operational effectiveness. The probability that a failed system will 
be restored to working order is called maintainability of the system. In other words, 
maintainability is the probability of isolating and repairing a "fault" in a system within a 
given time. There is a relationship between maintainability and repair rate µ and hence 
with the mean-time-to-repair (MTTR). MTTR and µis always related: 
1 
µ= MTTR 
MTTR and µ are related to maintainability M(t) as follows: 
t M(t) = 1 - exp(-µt) = 1 - exp ( ) 
MTTR 
where t is the permissible time constraint for the maintenance action. 
The availability of a system is the probability that a system will be "up", i.e. 
functioning according to expectation at any tine during its scheduled working period. 
Availability = System up-time/(System-up time + System down-time) 
= System up-time/(System-up time + No. of failures x MTTR) 
= System up-time/(System-up time + System-up time xA. x MTTR) 
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1 
= 
l+(A-xMITR) 
MTBF 
since A= 
1 
= 
MTBF+MITR MTBF 
If the MTTR can be reduced, availability will increase and the system will be more 
economical. A system where faults are rapidly diagnosed is more desired than a system 
which has a lower failure rate but where the cause of a failure takes a long time to locate, 
and consequently a lengthy system down time is needed for repair. 
Redundant system design models with repairable components can improve system 
reliability compared with the non-redundant models; it is also true that reduced 
component MTTR increases system reliability/availability. Figure 4.2 and 4.3 are the 
state diagrams illustrating a system with only one component, without and with 
redundancy respectively. "1" in the diagrams means the component is functioning, while 
"O'' means the component fails. 
0 
(Failed) 
Figure 4.2 State diagram of one-component system without redundancy 
O+O 
(Failed) 
Figure 4.3 State diagram of one-component system with redundancy 
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4.3 System Modeling and Reliability Analysis 
In order to evaluate and compare the benefit of different fault tolerance mechanisms, 
the real time operating and control system is modeled with various redundancy 
configurations using HiMAP [12], a hierarchical reliability modeling and analysis 
package. The individual computer system such as substation control system and control 
center EMS/SCADA system, integrated control center - substation operation and control 
system, and different control center backup configurations are modeled; their reliabilities 
are studied and compared for practical values of component failure rates and repair rates. 
The studies have been carried out with and without taking repair into account assuming 
fixed failure and repair rates. Also, the studies assume the failures are independent, i.e., 
fault in one component does not induce fault in another component. 
4.3.1 Substation Control System Modeling 
The substation control system is simply represented by one controller 
(communication server) connected to the substation information/communication bus. 
Following are the three substation control system configurations. In all the system 
models, we assume that the failure rates of substation server and communication bus is A. 
= lE-4; the repair rates of them isµ = 0.1. 
I) (I+ I) controller + (I+ I) bus full redundancy model 
This model describes the substation control system in full redundancy, which has dual 
buses and one controller with one backup in hot standby. The diagram of this system is 
shown in Figure 4.4(a). The hierarchical model of this system for reliability analysis is 
shown in Figure 4.4(b). 
2) (l+l) controller+ I bus half redundancy model 
This model is for the system that has one controller with one backup in hot standby 
but only one bus. 
3) I controller + I bus non-redundancy model 
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This model is for the system that has one controller and one bus without any 
component redundancy. 
Controller Controller 
Figure 4.4 (a) Substation control system in full redundancy 
'and' gate 'or' gate~ 
Figure 4.4(b) Hierarchical model for full redundant substation control system 
The reliabilities of the above three different substation control system configurations 
are plotted against time. Figure 4.5(a) shows their reliabilities against time without 
considering repair, while Figure 4.5(b) shows the reliabilities when considering repair. 
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- 1 bus + 1 controller 
- 1 bus + (1 +1) controller 
- - - · (1 +1) bus + (1 +1) controller 
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 
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Figure 4.5(a) Substation control system reliability without repair 
Component failure rate 'A = lE-4 
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Figure 4.5(b) Substation control system reliability with repair 
Component failure rate 'A = lE-4, repair rate µ = 0.1 
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From Figure 4.5(a) and Figure 4.5(b), we can see that high redundancy level always 
implies high reliability. Repairable components do improve the system reliability except 
in the case that all components have no redundancy, since in this kind of system, any 
component failure means system failure, repair is meaningless. This can also explain why 
the reliability of the full redundant system with dual buses and (1+1) controller improves 
much more than other systems with the same component repair rate. 
4.3.2 Control Center EMS/SCADA System Modeling 
The control center EMS/SCADA system is represented by one data acquisition server 
and one database server connected to the control center LAN. Four different 
configurations are modeled as following. In all the system modeling, we also assume that 
the failure rates of the data acquisition server, the database server, and the 
communication bus is 'A. = lE-4; the repair rates of them is µ = 0.1. 
1) (1+1) bus+ (2+2) server model 
This model describes control center EMS/SCADA system in full redundancy, which 
has dual buses, 1 data acquisition server with one backup in hot standby, and 1 database 
server with one backup in hot standby. The system diagram is shown in Figure 4.6. 
Database Database Comm. Comm. 
Server Server Server Server 
I I I I 
Figure 4.6 Control center EMS/SCADA system in full redundancy 
(2) I bus + (2+2) server model 
This model is for the system that has database and data acquisition servers with 
backups in hot standby, but with only one communication bus. 
3) (I+ I) bus + 2 server model 
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This model is for the system that has dual communication buses but the database and 
data acquisition servers without backup. 
4) 1 bus + 2 server model 
This model describes the system that has the communication bus, database server, and 
data acquisition server without backup. 
Figure 4.7(a) and Figure 4.7(b) shows the reliabilities of these four control center 
EMS/SCADA system configurations versus time, without and with considering repair, 
respectively. From Figure 4.7(a) and Figure 4.7(b), we can also see that high redundancy 
level always implies high reliability. Repairable components do improve the system 
reliability except in the case that all components have no redundancy. We may conclude 
that for most individual computer systems, those results are always true. 
4.3.3 Integrated Operation and Control System Modeling 
For modeling, we assume the control center without fault-tolerance consists of 1 
communication bus and 2 servers with the bus connecting the servers (one SCAD A data 
acquisition server and one EMS database server). The control center is said to have failed 
if either of the bus, SCADA or EMS server has failed. The substation and power plant 
without fault-tolerance consists of 1 communication bus and 1 communication server. 
The substations and power plant are connected to the control center using wide-area 
communication links. In our studies, we assume two sets of failure rates and repair rates 
values. The first set assumes all components in the integrated system has the same failure 
rate A. = IE-4; the repair rate of the servers and communication buses in control center 
and substation is µ = 0.1, while the repair rate of the communication link is µ = 0.02. 
The second set makes the following realistic assumption on the reliabilities of the various 
system components: control center server has the highest reliability, and then control 
center and substation bus, followed by substation server, and the last one is wide area 
communication link which has the lowest reliability among the components; the repair 
rates of components for computing systems (servers and bus) are assumed to be lower 
than the repair rate of communication system (wide-area links). 
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Figure 4.7(a) Control center EMS/SCADA system reliability without repair 
Component failure rate A.= lE-4 
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Figure 4.7(b) Control center EMS/SCADA system reliability with repair 
Component failure rate A.= lE-4, repair rate µ = 0.1 
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Following are the modeling of the four integrated operation and control system 
configurations for the two sets of failure rate and repair rate values. At the end of this 
section, we also give the studies of the integrated operation and control system reliability 
with respect to various components failure rates. 
1) Integrated operation and control system with full redundancy 
This model adopts (1+1) bus+ (2+2) server model in control center and (1+1) bus+ 
(1+1) controller model in substation (power plant), dual communication links connect 
each substation (power plant) control system and control center with the same failure rate 
and repair rate. This system configuration is shown in Figure 4.8. 
Power Plant 
(1+1) bus+ (1+1) server 
Control Center 
(1+1) bus + (2+2) server 
Transmission Substation 
(1+1) bus + (1+1) server 
Distribution Substation 
(1+1) bus+ (1+1) server 
Figure 4.8 Integrated operation and control system in full redundancy 
2) Integrated operation and control system with computing system redundancy 
This model adopts (l+l) bus+ (2+2) server model in control center and (1+1) bus+ 
(1+1) controller model in substation, while only one communication link connect each 
substation (power plant) control system and control center. Without communication link 
redundancy, any communication link failure will cause the integrated system failure. 
3) Integrated operation and control system with communication link redundancy 
This model adopts 1 bus + 2 server model in control center and 1 bus + 1 controller 
model in substation (power plant), dual communication links connect each substation 
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(power plant) control system and control center with the same failure rate and repair rate. 
Without computation redundancy in individual computer system, any component failure 
in an individual computing system will cause system failure. 
4) Integrated operation and control system without redundancy 
This model adopts 1 bus + 2 server model in control center and 1 bus + 1 controller 
model in substation (power plant), and only one communication link connect each 
substation (power plant) control system and control center with the same failure rate and 
repair rate. In this system, any component failure in an individual computing system or 
communication link failure will cause system failure. 
Figure 4.9(a) and Figure 4.9(b) are the reliabilities of the four integrated operation 
and control system models versus time, without and with considering repair, respectively. 
They adopt the first set of failure rates and repair rates, that is, identical failure rate for all 
components, with the repair rate of computing system components is higher than wide 
area communication links. 
Figure 4.lO(a) and Figure 4.lO(b) also show the reliabilities of the four integrated 
operation and control system models without and with considering repair, respectively. 
The difference between Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 is that Figure 4.10 adopts the second 
set of failure rates and repair rates, that is, various failure rates for system components, 
with the repair rate of computing system components is still higher than wide area 
communication links. 
Figure 4.11 (a) and Figure 4.11 (b) study the reliabilities of the four integrated 
operation and control system models with respect to various component failures, without 
and with considering repair, respectively. 
From the results, it can be seen that a system with higher redundancy and higher 
component failure rate can be more reliable than a system with lower redundancy and 
lower component failure rate. This indicates that usually a higher reliability can be 
obtained by employing less reliable components with high redundancy than employing 
high reliable components with less redundancy. We can also say that full redundant 
system can use less reliable components without sacrificing system reliability if 
considering repair. 
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Fig 4.9(a) Integrated system reliability without repair 
Component failure rate A.= lE-4 
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Figure 4.9(b) Integrated system reliability with repair 
Component failure rate A.= lE-4, repair rate µ = 0.1 for buses, servers, and 
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Figure 4.lO(a) Integrated system reliability without pair 
Varied component failure rates: control center server A = 5E-5; bus A= 7.5E-5; 
substation controller A. = lE-4: comm. Link A.= 2.5E-4 
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Figure 4.1 O(b) Integrated system reliability with repair 
Varied component failure rates: control center server A. = 5E-5; bus A.= 7.5E-5; 
substation controller A. = lE-4; comm. Link A. = 2.5E-4 
Repair rate: µ = 0.1 for buses, servers, and controllers, µ = 0.02 for 
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Figure 4.11 (a) Integrated system reliability vs. component failure rate without repair 
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Figure 4.11 (b) Integrated system reliability vs. component failure rate with repair 
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4.3.4 Different Backup Control Center Configurations Modeling 
The loss of a control center poses a serious threat to an electric utility company and 
its operations. Under the circumstance of deregulation and competition, control center 
operation and control systems are tightly interconnected; open access of real-time power 
system information is very important to secure operation and successful interchanges 
between entities, so the loss of one control center system, which means part unavailablity 
of operating data, may impact a wide area of power system grid operation. 
If an emergency occurs and the primary control center is lost, there must be an 
alternate way to operate the power system. Many utilities have built the backup control 
centers, which is a place that the utility's operating personnel will use as the control 
center when a disaster occurs which prevents the system operators from gaining access to 
utilizing the capacities of the primary control center. The design of a backup center will 
not be identical for every utility, the functional capability of a utility's backup control 
center will reflect the particular needs of the utility based on the kind of emergencies, and 
the utility's normal operating practices. Considering all these factors together with the 
cost will comprehensively decide how to design the backup control center to meet the 
objective of the utility while minimizing the cost as much as possible. 
With the rapid development of information technology and communication 
techniques, more alternatives of the design of the backup center are available for utilities. 
Here, we propose four configurations of backup control center scheme and study their 
reliabilities. We will also evaluate the designs in terms of their load handling capability 
and cost. In order to decrease the size of the system model, one substation control system 
connected to the control center through one communication link represents one integrated 
system, we use 1 bus + 1 server model in control center and 1 bus + 1 controller model in 
the substation. The four backup configurations for connecting two substations to the 
control centers will be illustrated in the follows. 
1) Basic configuration modeling (no backup control center) 
This configuration models the reliability of two integrated control center - substation 
systems without backup control center; each substation is connected to only one control 
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center. Here, the number of substations and control centers are 2 and 2, respectively. The 
system configuration is shown in Figure 4.12. 
Control Center 1 Control Center 2 
1 bus + 1 server 1 bus + 1 server 
Substation 1 Substation 2 
1 bus + 1 controller 1 bus + 1 controller 
Figure 4.12 Basic no backup control center configuration 
2) Exclusive backup control center configuration modeling 
This configuration models the reliability of two integrated control center - substation 
systems with one backup for each control center; each substation is connected to a 
primary control center and an "exclusive" backup control center. Here, the number of 
substations and control centers are 2 and 4, respectively. The system configuration is 
shown in Figure 4.13. 
Control Center 1 
1 bus + 1 server 
Substation 1 
1 bus + 1 controller 
Backup center 1 
1 bus + 1 server 
Control Center 2 
1 bus + 1 server 
Backup center 2 
1 bus + 1 server 
Substation 2 
1 bus + 1 controller 
Figure 4.13 Exclusive backup control center configuration 
54 
3) Shared backup control center configuration 
This configuration models the reliability of two integrated control center - substation 
systems with two control centers sharing one backup; each substation is connected to a 
primary control center and the "shared" backup control center. Here, the number of 
substations and control centers are 2 and 3, respectively. The system configuration is 
shown in Figure 4.14. 
Control Center 1 
1 bus + 1 server 
Substation 1 
1 bus + 1 controller 
Backup center 1 
1 bus + 1 server 
Control Center 2 
1 bus + 1 server 
Substation 2 
1 bus + 1 controller 
Figure 4.14 Shared backup control center configuration 
4) Mutual backup control center configuration modeling 
This configuration models the reliability of two integrated control center - substation 
systems with each control center being backup for the other, that is each substation has a 
primary control center that is also being configured as the backup control center for the 
other substation. Here, the number of substations and control centers are 2 and 2, 
respectively. Figure 4.15 gives the system configuration. 
The reliabilities of these four different backup control center configurations are 
studied and plotted in Figure 4.16(a). Figure 4.16(b) uses the same models as Figure 
4.16( a) except that (1+1) server model is used to represent control center and (1+1) 
controller model is used to represent the substation, which implies higher reliable 
subsystems such as control center and substation operation and control system. 
Control Center 1 
1 bus + 1 server 
Substation 1 
1 bus + 1 controller 
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Control Center 2 
1 bus + 1 server 
Substation 2 
1 bus + 1 controller 
Figure 4.15 Mutual backup control center configuration 
From Figure 4.16(a), it can be observed that the other three backup control center 
configurations indeed improve the overall system reliability comparing with the no 
backup schemes, while the reliability of mutual backup configuration is the best with the 
least redundancy employed, and the reliability of exclusive backup configuration is the 
worst with the most redundancy employed. This study shows that higher redundancy 
does not necessarily offer high reliability. Therefore, the fault-tolerant configuration 
plays a crucial role in determining the overall reliability of the system as evident from our 
studies. 
From Figure 4. l 6(b ), we can see that with higher reliable subsystems, the reliabilities 
of different backup schemes are closer than with lower reliable subsystems. The 
difference is too slight to be considered. So choosing appropriate backup scheme will 
mainly depend on the actual conditions and the expected service level under failures. 
Although the difference in reliability among the three fault-tolerant configurations is 
very small for the failure rates studied, higher redundancy means higher service level 
with the presence of "certain failure scenarios". For example, if both control centers fail, 
then the mutual backup can serve no applications, while shared backup with 50% service 
and the exclusive backup with 100% service; if one control center fails, then the mutual 
backup can serve 50% applications, while shared backup with 100% service and the 
exclusive with 100% service. Of course, higher redundancy also means more cost. 
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Figure 4.16( a) Reliability of backup control center configurations 
Component failure rate A,= lE-4 
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Figure 4. l 6(b) Reliability of backup control center configurations (Cont.) 
Component failure rate A,= lE-4 
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4.4 Summary 
This chapter presented fault-tolerant design and the reliability analysis of the different 
redundancy configurations. The reliability studies have been carried out with and without 
taking repair into account assuming exponential fault and repair rates. The studies assume 
the failures are independent, the component failure rates and repair rate are fixed. The 
reliabilities of different configurations are studied and compared for practical values of 
component failure rates and repair rates. 
The result indicates that for computation and communication redundancy design, higher 
component failure rate implies lower system reliability, while fully redundant system can 
use less reliable components without sacrificing much system reliability with repairable 
components. The reliabilities provided by the three fault-tolerance backup control center 
schemes are very close with highly reliable subsystems, but schemes with higher 
redundancy can provide better service level (i.e., load handling). 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Conclusions 
This work analyzed 163 disturbances reported by NERC; identified bottlenecks in 
current information systems. Based on the analysis, this work proposed an innovative 
information architecture aiming to overcome the most of the deficiencies in current 
information and communication systems. The proposed information architecture is 
capable of providing secure, reliable, timely and scalable communication systems with 
guaranteed QoS. It takes into account fault-tolerance of several system components such 
as RTUs (IEDs), communication links, and automation and control systems. The load-
sharing scheme between peer computer systems based on MPLS VPN Internet services is 
suitable for possible large changes in computational loads brought about by external 
partners or failed EMS/SCADA systems. The VPN services can also provide timely and 
adequate information exchange among entities. The distributed nature of the computation 
in the proposed architecture reduces the burden on the higher-level computer systems 
through data aggregation, providing better operation and restoration guidelines for 
operators with more relevant and critical information. It is important that necessary 
security analysis tools be available at every level, from substation control system until 
ISO operating control center, to obtain reliable and better-controlled power system 
operations. The proposed information architecture can overcome most of the deficiencies 
of the current communication and information systems, it will definitely promote the 
process of data integration and standardization from all power system entities. 
In order to evaluate and compare the benefits of the different fault tolerance 
mechanisms proposed, this work also modeled the real-time operating and control system 
with various redundancy configurations using the HIMAP software package. The 
reliabilities of different configurations are studied and compared for practical values of 
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component failure rates and repair rates. Configurations that offer a high level of 
reliability are identified. Reliability analysis of the different redundancy configurations 
indicates that for computation and communication redundancy design, high component 
failure rate implies lower system reliability, while fully redundant system can use less 
reliable components without sacrificing much system reliability with repairable 
components. The reliabilities provided by the three backup control center schemes are 
very close with highly reliable subsystems, but schemes with higher redundancy can 
provide better service level. 
5.2 Scope for Future Work 
We have designed a survivable information architecture for power systems that is 
able to facilitate fast detection and location of faults, fast restoration and maximum 
restoration after faults, providing adequate and timely intra- and inter-company 
information exchange for economic and reliable operations. Designs and fault-tolerance 
strategies for power information and communication systems were studied and analyzed. 
Based on this work, several possible topics could be further explored. 
• Reliability analysis under common-mode failure 
A Common-Mode Failure (CMF) [32][33] may occur in power information system 
when multiple faults that affect more than one fault containment region at the same time, 
generally due to a common cause, which may be design faults or operational faults, 
hardware faults or software errors, etc. Unlike independent hardware faults, the sources 
of CMFs are so diverse that numerous disparate techniques are required to predict, avoid, 
remove, and tolerate them. And the design of techniques and tools to deal with common-
mode failures is a very important growing area of research. A comprehensive approach to 
deal with CMF requires a deep understanding of the application and its environment in 
addition to a very good understanding of the hardware, software employed and their 
interactions. 
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Research can be carried out to develop techniques and tools to manage CMF in power 
information systems. This includes both developing novel techniques and adapting 
known techniques to the power information system. 
• Intrusion detection and infrastructure security 
The growing reliance of the electric power industry on information technologies 
introduces the concerns of security. There has been significant research and development 
[34][35] in information security focusing on encryption, authentication to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of data and transaction. Also, there has 
been research in infrastructure security focusing on distributed denial of service attack-
tolerance and firewall (VPN firewall and Demilitarized Zone) to ensure the information 
infrastructure is protected against security breaches. From power system point of view, 
the suitable adoption of these solutions to power information systems taking the 
application-specific requirements into account can be studied. 
Searching for the security solution to the power system, which should be viewed as 
an integrated solution involving both physical system security and information system 
security, is another exciting area to explore. And the challenge is to secure the inter-
dependency between physical power systems and information systems. 
• Hidden failure analysis 
Hidden failure is defined as a defect such as a component failure, inappropriate 
setting or incorrect external condition that remains undetected until some other system 
event causes the hidden failure to initiate a cascading outage [36]. Although hidden 
failures in protection systems are not common, they usually show up when the system is 
overstressed and they had been found to be key elements in many wide-area disturbances. 
It is possible with the available resources to create a Local Hidden Failure Monitoring 
and Control System (LHFMCS) to analyze changes and operations in the local protection 
system and adapt operation of the relays based on the known system conditions including 
natural phenomena information. One use of hidden failure analyses is the implementation 
of a hidden failure protection system where after the operation of previously identified 
key relays in the system, a hidden failure protection relay will monitor all subsequent 
relaying actions to determine the likelihood of having a hidden failure. If a secondary 
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relaying action is considered unreliable for its hidden failure risk it may be blocked by 
the local hidden failure protection relay. The implementation of such a system requires 
the use of an integrated real-time communication and information network capable of 
monitoring all key relays in the area. 
Hidden failure analysis will also have a significant impact on reducing the spread of 
system failures. The proposed LHFMCS can be part of a more general System-wide 
Hidden Failure Monitoring and Control System (SHFMCS). Hidden failure analysis of 
adjacent areas can be initiated after a local protection action is taken using the 
information provided by the activated LHFMCS system. Detection of a highly risky 
hidden failure by the SHFMCS can be used to block a relaying, load shedding, or 
islanding action in a system section adjacent to the fault-originating section. 
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